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It is a trite saying that this is an era of discontent. It is equally trite,
perhaps, to say that its causes are numerous and complex. Possibly the
tritenes is the most satisfactory evidence of the truth. Among the
causes of restlessness and agitation one of the most important, undoubt-
edly, is the employer-employee relation. This may conveniently be
expressed as the "wage question." It is becoming increasingly clear
that upon the way in which the difficulties involved in this issue are met
rest not alone the welfare of the people of the United States but as well
the permanency of the very foundations of our industrial-political-
social institutions.
Unfortunately some groups interested in affecting a remedy are
defeating the purpose sought by the method adopted. One of these
groups is made up of employers who insist upon a thorough-going
individualistic, laissez-faire policy; a policy of personal ownership and
management with no assistance or "interference" from outside.
Another group is composed of the "agitator" type of worker who
would deprive all others of a voice in business control and take over
and manage industry unaided; the radical forms of policy represented
by the numerous "isms" into which socialism has recently been divided.
A third group consists of the well-disposed but troublesome members
of society who, without much knowledge and with much less judgment,
talk of some plan to be universally adopted as a sure guaranty of the
millennium. Thus confusion of method and confusion of understand-
ing inevitably result.
In the presence of such an introduction, it may appear presumptuous
to speak of a remedy, and to avoid such an impression it must be said
that what follows is not offered as a "solution"; or as in any sense a
dogmatic statement of a method or plan of procedure. It does appear
clear, however, that there are some issues of economics that must be
cleared up and some issues of law to be clarified before definite progress
of a permanent character can be made.
The economist has had his opportunity to make a contribution, but
whether or not he has succeeded, is an open question. His theoretical
offerings have not been impressive to outsiders. Similarly the law has
often been called on for assistance and.again it must be said that some
of the offerings from this source also lack impressiveness among laymen.
Yet from these sources must come, if they come at all, the guiding
principles by which a transition may be effected from the troublesome
present with its inequalities and its discontent to a better future with
greater degree of general welfar6 and common strivings for mutually
satisfactory relations. Thinkers in economics have long sought a
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principle that would at once explain and justify the wages of labor as
they develop in the economics of distribution. Likewise jurists and
lawyers have sought the legal principles involved in wage bargaining.
Success has not yet crowned these efforts.
The history of wage theories is a fascinating study, and while much
is learned from its pursuit, it must be said that the conclusions are not
convincing either in logical or in scientific method to those who look for
a working basis in principle. If the successive economic interpretations
of wage principles are reviewed, each interpretation in turn will appear
either to one or the other bargainer or to both bargainers as unac-
ceptable. Not to undertake any such full review, reference to three
such theories must suffice. Malthus and Ricardo contributed the earliest
of these during the first quarter of the nineteenth century. In name it
is known as the "iron law" of wages and sought to establish in principle
that the wages of labor would tend toward the minimum of subsistence
necessary for the laborer's family. A wage below this amount would
increase the death rate and decrease the birth rate and consequently
give rise to a scarcity of labor. Industry then in order to preserve itself
would be obliged to increase wages. When the wages rose above this
necessary minimum the birth rate would increase and the death rate
would decrease, there would be "an excess of labor," and this excess-
would be reduced by the "niggardliness of nature." No comment is
necessary to bring out the pessimism and. the fatalism of such a view.
It soon gave way to a second explanation, somewhat directly related to
it; the Wages Fund principle. This theory was generally accepted as
orthodox during the middle period of the century. It had a distin-
guished list of advocates to give it authority and a form of expression
such as to make it logically convincing. As James Mill expressed it:,
"Universally, then, we may affirm, other things remaining the same,
that, if the ratio which capital and population bear to one another
remains the same, wages will remain the same; if the ratio which capital
bears to population increases, wages will rise; if the ratio which popula-
tion bears to capital increases, wages will fall." Mill's still more distin-
guished son, John Stuart Mill, gave to this theory its finished form :2
"Wages not only depend upon the relative amount of capital and popu-
lation, but cannot under the rule of competition be affected by anything
else. Wages (meaning, of course, the general rate) cannot rise but
by an increase of the aggregate funds employed in hiring laborers, or a
diminution of the number of competitors for hire; nor fall, except
either by a diminution of the funds devoted to paying labor, or by an
increase in the number of laborers to be paid." Even though Mill
himself stated later in life that this was. not an adequate or accurate
statement, its influence was impaired rather than annulled by the admis-
sion. For some time it shared honorg with the third principle, to which
'Elements of Political Economy (1821) ch. 2, sec. 2.
'Principles of Political Economy (1848) bk. 2, ch. ii, sec. i.
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it has finally yielded almost entirely, the Productivity Theory. This is
more broadly a theory of distribution, applicable alike to all four shares;
interest, profits and rent as well as wages. For present purposes the
statement may be limited to wages. It rests upon the broader principle
of diminishing return and marginal or final utility. The name to be
most directly associated with the development of this theory is John
Bates Clark. It may be variously stated, for it is difficult to formulate
it concisely. Clark says :' "The law of wages would stand thus: (i)
By a common mercantile rule, all men of a given degree of ability must
take what -marginal men of that same ability get. This principle fixes
the market rate of wages. (2) Marginal men get what they produce.
This principle governs wages more remotely, by fixing a natural
standard for them." "Each unit of labor, then, is worth to its employer
what the last unit produces." And more summarily stated: "As real
as gravity is the force that draws the actual pay of men toward a
standard that is set by the final productivity law." In another form
Seager expresses this law :4 "Under conditions of free, all-sided compe-
tition the earnings of the marginal, as of other, workmen, tend to
correspond to the contributions which they make to production."
Thus one theory has followed another and even now the Productivity
Theory is not without rivals. To say that any or all of them are
entirely false, would be saying too much. There is no other than an
abstract and "long run" application of the best of them to wage
controversies. And such applications do not satisfy either the employer
-or the employee-side of the controversy. One result is the develop-
ment of socialist theories and socialist programs directly and obviously
based upon them. This gives the one undesirable extreme. Another
result is the development of so-called business principles, or theories,
and programs resting directly upon them, so generally expressed as
Demand and Supply. This opens the door to the opposite and equally
undesirable extreme. A third result is the pursuit of Pure Theory from
which no immediate program can be directly drawn. The obvious dis-
advantage of this is that Economic Theory (or the Science of Eco-
nomics, as a Pure Science) has nothing to offer to the solution of the
problem except (and the exception may be regarded as of more or of
less importance) a fundamental test of the long run validity of any and
every program.
In so far as the employee-interest understands any of these wage
theories, no one is satisfactory. The minimum of subsistence theory
promises him salvation but no more. The Wages Fund theory gives
him all he can get from his employer and promises him that the employer
will keep all he does not have to give up. This generates the fighting
spirit. The Marginal Productivity Theory tells him that if the group
is numerous the marginal product will be less and the wage less. In
'The Distribution of Wealth (1899) chs. 7, 8.
'Principles of Economics (3d ed. 1923) 261.
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other words, as laborers come into competition with *each other, the
wage inevitably falls. There is nothing in any of these when expressed
in language intelligible to him that he is willing to accept. The
employer-interest does not understand them much more clearly, but is
willing to tolerate them, partly because they are "mere theory," and
partly because they suggest either a sort of paternal control which he
is quite willing to accept, or competition which he quite well under-
stands. On these two bases he has developed his guiding business
principle.
A summary of legal or political theories may be made much more
briefly. They may all be said to rest upon general principles formu-
lated a century or more ago and'still current. They are too familiar to
need repetition. All men are created equal; they have, as citizens,
certain constitutional or political or civil rights; the rights to life, to
liberty, to pursuit of happiness, to property, to equal protection of the
laws; and the rights shall not be modified or restricted-citizens shall
not be deprived of these rights--except by due process of law. This
is all very familiar. While their formulation runs back to much earlier
times, and while they are closely related to the "eternal principles" of
"justice" and "right," their application has caused increasing difficul-
ties. Both industrial and social conditions have changed within two
centuries and have greatly changed in a half century. Interpretation of
these political and constitutional principles has been changed also.
Extremes appear in these interpretations. Literal interpretation with
little if any adaptability gives the one extreme, which appears as an
ultra-conservative or reactionary policy and another extreme in the
form of ultra-radical or revolutionary programs. Between these
extremes, legal or constitutional philosophy is having difficulties. Thus
the middle road program of rational progress and sound industrial
policy is difficult to find and perhaps even more difficult to keep.
From economic theories, past and present, has come a dangerous
admixture of truth and falsehood, of assistance and obstruction, of
light and shadow. From legal and constitutional interpretation has
likewise come a similar admixture, with one difference of great impor-
tance-Economic truth and falsity may be accepted or rejected, and
those who differ may defer the application or accept it tentatively for
practical working purposes. A legal compound of these ingredients
may be made and the conclusion officially or authoritatively declared.
When this is done, the conclusion is "so." It is the "law." There is
no choice but to act in accordance with it until it is no longer "so"; until
it is with equal authority set aside and its place taken with another
similarly stated. What then is the purpose of an attempt to bring
together a statement of principles of wages on the one hand from
economic analysis and on the other from legal analysis? Many excel-
lent purposes may be served by such an effort. The present one is to
institute certain comparisons and to point the way to the middle road
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of orderly progress; to make a forward movement possible and to hold
its course to a desired end.
Within the limits of a single article, both critical and constructive
treatment is not possible. The constructive treatment should wait upon
the critical.
The various economic theories above referred to have had just enough
of truth in them to be appealing to a practical analyst. Population
supplies the labor market. Wage cost is a part of general cost and what
is paid for one cost can not be used for another. It is good book keep-
ing. If wage represents what labor produces it must be fair and just.
Out of these elements is built up the business principle of demand and
supply; the labor market; the wage bargain; the contract agreement;
all of which rest upon the virtues of a competitive system. If the
employer-interest desires further benefit from the bargaining, -this
interest seeks to affect the demand side favorably to itself. If the
employee-interest is not satisfied, it seeks to control more effectively the
supply side of the market. This gives us competition. In a somewhat
vague way the community seeks to temper the rigor of the competitive
rivalry by public opinion, by consumers' organizations, by law. Of the
first two nothing need be said here, but the last one belongs to the
discussion.
Competition leads to a wage; but it does not necessarily follow that
it leads to an "economic" wage or to a "fair" wage. When an econo-
mist assumes that a wage in the competitive market is the expression
either of an "iron law," or of a just share of a "fund" of capital, or
of the share that labor has "produced," he is more logical than scien-
tific. Before economic theorists can urge their theory (or theories) as
a satisfactory guide in wage determination, scientific methods of wage
study must be carried farther than they have yet been pushed. The
same is true of the legal theories. It cannot be urged as a matter of
legal principle that a practical competitive wage is necessarily a "fair"
wage. And before lawyers and judges can urge the application of
their theories, there must likewise be a departure from deductive logic
in the direction of scientific induction. To join these two statements;
it must not be assumed either in "argument" or "opinion" that because
a conclusion flows with smooth logic from the major premise, that
conclusion is necessarily true. The logic of the conclusion is derived
from the assumption of the major premise. It is the truth of the major
premise. that must be tested. "Under conditions of free, all-sided
competition," runs the Productivity Theory, "the earnings of marginal,
as of other, workmen tend to correspond accurately to the contribution
which they make to production." Conditions of free all-sided competi-
tion do not exist in modem industrial life. It is doubtful if any
approved standard of competition can be found actually existent. But
granted that such competition as provided for in this theory does exist,
then wages will tend to correspond to the earners' marginal productivity.
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At best it is a tendency. The significance of this term should not be
overlooked.
Illustrations from court opinions are too numerous to be exhausted in
this connection. The recent District of Columbia Minimum Wage case
serves every purpose and its views are fresh in mind.
5 This is a five to
three decision. Assuming that Mr. Justice Brandeis would have voted
with the minority as he championed the law as an attorney, it may be
called a five to four decision. Another case, very recent, is that of the
Kansas Court of Industrial Relations." This was a unanimous
opinion of the United States Supreme Court and reversed a decision of
the Kansas State Supreme Court.
7  The opinion of the Kansas court,
though not a unanimous decision, may be taken as a dissenting opinion
for present purposes, as the latter was set aside by the former.
Running through the prevailing opinions is the assumption that there
are certain general principles which must be applied to all cases, regard-
less of detailed distinctions between one case and another. It is deduc-
tive logic, with very broad generalizations such as have been stated
above constituting the major premise and with the preconceptions of
the judges, the minor premise leading to the conclusion of unconstitu-
tionality in each case. The minority opinions proceed with about the
same assumptions as major premises, but the preconceptions as to minor
premises differ and therefore the conclusions differ. It is not easy to
arrange the statements in strict syllogistic form biecause the dissent does
not follow the same order as the prevailing opinion and the method of
statement in both is more purely literary. In spite of the difficulty,
however, the effort is instructive. The fifth amendment guarantees that
no citizen shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law. Liberty to contract is a form of liberty. Therefore
no citizen shall be deprived of liberty of contract without due process
of law. By this method freedom of contract has been read into the
constitution and becomes a constitutional right in itself. It then follows
that the act in question restricts freedom of contract. Therefore the
act is unconstitutional. But the minority does not think that freedom
of contract is a necessary part of the fifth amendment. The "vague
contour" of this amendment makes its reference no more specific than
"an unpretentious assertion of the liberty to follow the ordinary
callings." Later this "innocuous generality was expanded into the
dogma, Liberty of Contract. Contract is not specifically mentioned in
the text." Therefore freedom of contract is not a specifically implied
constitutional right."
'Adkins v. Childrees Hospital (1923) 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394.
' Wolff Packing Co. v. Kanas Court of Industrial Relations (1923) 262 U. S.
522. 43 Sup. Ct. 63o. See COMMENTS (1923) 33 YALz LAW JOURNAL, 196.
Court of Induimtrial Relations v. Wolff Packing Co. (ig2i) 1O9 Kan, 629, 201
Pac. 418; (1922) iii Kan. 5o, 2 7 Pac. 8o6. See (1921) 31 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 206; (1922) 31 ibid. 450.
'Opinion of Justice Holmes.
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Another view develops as follows--"It is the rule that every possible
presumption is in favor of the validity of an act of Congress until over-
come by actual doubt." This general rule appears to be nowhere
questioned by any authority. And yet the validity of acts of Congress is
not only questioned but denied. Of course the test is reasonableness.
Justice Sutherland adds to his statement of the rule the following
qualification: "But if by clear and indubitable demonstration a statute
be opposed to the Constitution, we have no choice but to say so." This
creates a distinction between what appears to be and what is. To the
majority the statute by "clear and indubitable demonstration" is
opposed to the Constitution and the court has "no choice but to say so."
In the dissent the matter is handled in a different manner. From this
point of view it appears that public welfare is distinctly related to this
legislation. The means of securing this welfare have the approval of
Congress, of many states and of foreign governments. "When so
many intelligent persons, who have studied the matter more than any of
us can, have thought that the means are effective and are worth the
price it seems to me impossible to deny that the belief reasonably may
be held by reasonable men." To this statement Justice Holmes adds:
"To me-the power of Congress seems absolutely free from doubt."
Chief Justice Taft says: "Congress took this view and we cannot say it
was not warranted in so doing." In connection with this same issue
of reasonableness both dissenting opinions lay emphasis upon the view
that experience provides support for the belief that a "sweating wage"
has a great and direct tendency "to bring about an injury to the health
and morals of workers," and that much expert testimony supports such
a conclusion. The minority finds this evidence to bear witness of
reasonable doubt; the majority finds it "interesting but only mildly
persuasive."
This may be recast into a form about as follows: If the legislature
passed the statute, they did not act reasonably. It was only alleged
reasonableness. Even though some members of the court vote to
sustain the statute, they act only on alleged reason. It is not sufficient
that the act appear reasonable to anybody or to everybody. It must
be-clearly and indubitably be-reasonable. Inevitably follows the
question; how is the distinction to be made clear between what appears
and what is. The working adjustment of the difficulty is that a
majority vote determines what is-that is to say, if the reasonableness
appears to the majority to be, then it is, and the minority are deceived
by appearances. But Justice Sutherland would not consent to this
method generally, since he says that the evidence which leads the act
to appear reasonable to three of the members of the court tends to
"establish the desirability or undesirability of the legislation; but they
reflect no legitimate light upon the question of its validity, and that is
what we are called upon to decide. The elucidation of that question can
not be aided by counting heads." Numbers do not make reasonableness.
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This confusion may be dissolved without great difficulty. On the one
hand it may be said that the police power is not to be extended to
further encroachment upon the freedom of action of citizens unless the
result of this loss be offset by a greater gain. Whether or not the
result is the greater gain is to be determined by scientific inquiry
through expert investigation and conclusion in accordance with correct
scientific method. It is true that numbers do not necessarily count. It
is scientific method that counts in validating the conclusion. The con-
clusion reached will be reasonable-that is to say, it will stand the test
of science. On the other hand it may be declared that the use of police
power depends upon precedent. If no precedent is found, the new
venture is not valid. Every new venture creates "reasonable presump-
tion" against it. The burden of proof lies with the advocates of the
new departure. This may be cast intcr form :-A new departure from
precedent uses of police power is of doubtful validity. It may not
appear so to some, but it is so nevertheless. This is logic. The conclu-
sion is logical. Now, if these two explanations be placed so as to run
parallel, it appears that the difference of opinion as to reasonableness
may rest upon two different conceptions of what is reasonable; (i)
what is scientific, and (2) what is logical. The prevailing opinion adopts
logical method. The dissenting opinion follows scientific method.
The conclusions are divergent. It may be worth while to note this
more especially in the opinions. The prevailing opinion finds a differ-
ence in kind between police power to determine, on the one hand, the
maximum number of hours in the work day for women (Muller v.
Oregon9 ) and, on the other hand, the minimum wages to be paid. In
the view of the prevailing opinion "the essential characteristic of the
statute now under consideration differentiates it from the laws fixing
hours of labor." Fixing hours of labor is a matter dealing with "the
incidents of the employment" and has no necessary effect upon "the
heart of the contract." "The statute in question . . . differs from
(legislation fixing hours) in every material respect .... It is simply
and exclusively a price-fixing law, confined to adult women .... who
are -legally as capable of contracting for themselves as men." Chief
Justice Taft (dissenting opinion) asserts that the difference, in so far
as any real difference exists, is not a substantive difference--"a restric-
tion as to one (wages) is not any greater in essence than the other
(hours) and is of the same kind." The conclusion of the majority
"appears to me to exaggerate the importance of the wage term of the
contract of employment as more inviolate than its other terms."
Another difference of interpretation grows out of the significance
attached to former cases. The prevailing opinion refers to the New
York Bake Shop case'0 which refused to sustain a statute in that state
limiting the hours of adult males in bakeries. Justice Sutherland says
(ia8) 208 U. S. 412, 28 Sup. Ct. 324.10Lochner v. New York (i9o5) i98 U. S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539.
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that "subsequent cases in this court have been distinguished from that
decision, but the principles therein stated have never been disapproved."
The logic follows-Legislators cannot limit the hours of labor of adult
male citizens in bakeries. Women now have equal political rights with
men (nineteenth amendment). The sex distinction therefore disap-
pears, civil differences between the sexes "have now come almost, if
not quite, to the vanishing point." And since the wage is a price-fixing
element, the most important element in the contract, the Lochner
principle, is of even greater significance. Differing with this, the Chief
Justice cites the more recent case, Bunting v. Oregon," in which this
court sustained an Oregon statute establishing a legal ten-hour day for
all male employees in occupations generally. This was certainly a
recognition of the broader legislative discretion. Justice Sutherland
says that the Lochner case has been distinguished from all later cases
and so its principles still hold. Chief Justice Taft says that there is
no reference in the Bunting case to the Lochner case and since "the
opinion in the Bunting case does not mention the Lochner case .....
certainly there was no attempt to distinguish it in the Bunting case..
It is impossible for me to reconcile the Bunting case and the Lochner
case, and I have always supposed that the Lochner case was thus over-
ruled sub silentio." Justice Holmes adds: "After Bunting v. Oregon
I had supposed that .... Lochner v. New York would be allowed a
deserved repose."
Not to continue the contrasts to the point of exhaustion, others may
be briefly noted, with omission of citations from the opinions. Civil
rights exist regardless of sex, declares the prevailing opinion. Espe-
cially emphasis is laid on the nineteenth amendment. This covers as a
general proposition the freedom of contract. The dissenting opinion
stresses the physiological distinction and does not yield so fully to the
effect of the amendment. The Chief Justice, in dissent, does not think
that the amendment makes necessary a modification of former constitu-
tional construction where that construction is based on physical differ-
ences between men and. women. Justice Holmes declares; "it will need
more than the nineteenth amendment to convince me that there are no
differences between men and women, or that legislation cannot take
those differences into account." The purpose of this discussion will be
served by the citation of one extract somewhat at length. It illustrates
a rather prevalent mode of reasoning.
"If in the interest of the public welfare the police power may be
invoked to justify the fixing of a minimum wage, it may, when the
public welfare is thought to require it, be invoked to justify a maximum
wage. The power to fix high wages connotes, by like course of reason-
ing, the power to fix low wages. If, in the face of the guaranties of the
Fifth Amendment, this form of legislation shall be legally justified, the
field for the operation of the police power will have been widened to a
" (,917) 243 U. S. 4.6, 37 Sup. Ct. 435.
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great and dangerous degree. If, for example, in the opinion of the
future law makers, wages in the building trades shall become so high as
to preclude people of ordinary means from building and owning homes,
an authority which sustains the minimum wage will be invoked to
support a maximum wage for building laborers and artisans, and the
same argument which has been here urged to strip the employer of his
constitutional liberty to contract in one direction will be utilized to strip
the employee of his constitutional liberty of contract in the opposite
direction."
The reply of the Chief Justice to this statement is brief. "This, I
submit, is a non sequitur." The distinction is "a matter of degree and
practical experience and not of pure logic."
The summary of the two opinions may be found in the following
expressions. The prevailing opinion concludes that the act is "so
clearly the product of a naked, arbitrary exercise of power that it
clearly cannot be allowed to stand under the Constitution of the United
States." Chief justice Taft, in his dissent, says that since Congress
took the view that there was definite and clearly recognized need for the
statute in the interest of public health and welfare, "we cannot say
that it was not warranted" in passing the law. justice Holmes
concludes: that since Congress held the legislation to be reasonable, its
constitutionality seems "absolutely free from doubt." Each side is
absolutely certain of the reasonableness of its position and yet they
do not agree.
To return to the earlier portion of this article; it is asserted that an
acute industrial situation is developing and the storm-center is forming
around the contention of wages. Clearly the two agencies that should
contribute most to the favorable solution of the difficulties are the
industrial principles worked out through the scientific agencies of
economics and the legal principles scientifically applied by legislatures
and squared with our fundamental principles of constitutional govern-
ment by the courts by methods equally scientific. It is doubtful if either
agency is meeting its full responsibility in this obligation. Economists
adopt involved statements of tendencies which, other things being equal,
will express themselves in the long run. This is good as pure theory.
Applied, it develops real differences in the shape of varying programs.
Practice must make tests of these programs, and the greatest practical
service of economists will be to safeguard the programs against extremes
in either direction. Within the limits of the extremes, they may divide
in advocacy of one or another experiment. So long as the need for
an experiment-is established with scientific (reasonable) clearness, it is
not sufficient to say simply that there can be no harm in making it.
More must be said. It must be declared that the experiment is posi-
tively a contribution to the solution of the problem. If the experiment
fail, either in whole or in part, a further scientific study will reveal the
causes of failure.
Quite similarly it may be said that legal principles are formulated in
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terms of generality which express a truth-a fundamental truth-but
express it in abstract terms, or in terms of pure legal theory. These are
good as legal theory. Applied, they develop real differences in judg-
ment on various proposed programs. It is equally true that practice
must take tests of these programs, and the greatest service of legislators
will be to examine scientifically the need for these experiments (pass
upon their reasonableness) and the greatest practical service of the
courts will be to make possible these reasonabiy necessary experiments
within the limits of constitutional (reasonable or scientific) procedure.
The limitations will prevent extremes in either direction and the bounda-
ries will at best be difficult to determine. Within the extremes, it may
be declared, it is not the function of the court to decide whether or not
the experiment shall be made. To the legislators is assigned that task.
Equally, also, it may be said that it is not sufficient for the court to say
that it is not unreasonable to interpret a general principle of the consti-
tution so that the proposed experiment may be tried. To be of the
greatest positive service in constructive progress the court must con-
clude that such experiments are positively reasonable (scientific) when
Congress has determined that they are reasonable (scientific). In
many cases the prevailing opinion, or even the unanimous opinion, has
been to the effect that Congress deemed the policy expressed in the act
desirable; and therefore valid. Further it has been pointed out that
if the policy proves undesirable as shown by results, it lies with
Congress to repeal it. If further developed, this attitude of the courts
holds promise of making a definitely valuable contribution to our Con-
stitutional law. It is also frequently pointed out that the choice of
industrial policy lies with public opinion reflected in legislation. It is
not for the courts to pass upon such policy in accordance with their own
industrial or economic views. This may with great profit become the
generally accepted attitude of the courts.
If both economics and Law join hands in departing from pure logic,
in refraining from shaping their conclusions in accordance with logical
reductio ad absurdum, in declining, with Mr. Justice Holmes, to act
upon the belief that general propositions decide concrete cases, there is
the hope that Economic theory of wages and legal theory of wages may
be fused into a practicable, workable, scientific, reasonable, constitu-
tional, and possibly logical basis upon which to work out the difficulties
of the times.
There are evidences that this is being slowly accomplished. There
are also evidences that the progress is dangerously slow. The courts,
entitled to the greatest respect, and jnstly so entitled, have in their
records the New York Tenement House case,
12 the Bake Shop case."
the New York State Workmen's Compensation case,
14 the Child Labor
'Matter of Jacobs (1885) 98 N. Y. 98.
" Lochner v. New York, supra note io.
"Ives v. South Buffalo R. R. (I911) 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431.
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cases,15 as well as the Minimum Wage case. These and other cases
have occasioned criticism from high and conservative sources. This
list should not be extended if the courts are to retain the exalted posi-
tion in our government that has almost universally been accorded them.
Critical in a different way, it is here suggested that many changes
have come about in.industry since 1787, and that the Amendments to
our Constitution have not grown directly out of any of them. These
changes are especially evident in that successor to the master and servant
relation the employer and employee relation-which expresses. a new
industrial era quite revolutionary in the extent of the changes. An
eighteenth century constitution cannot, without change, be fitted to these
twentieth century conditions. The new wage relations must be given
scope to adjust themselves. Quite necessarily there must be experimen-
tation. Minimum wage, minimum hours, standard of living, collective
bargaining, welfare work, arbitration, both compulsory and voluntary;
these are only a few of the list of proposed measures none of which
can be scientifically shown to be either good or bad as concrete policies
by method of logic. The Supreme Court has declared the wage fixing
function of the Kansas Industrial Court to be an activity in violation of
the Constitution of the United States. Possibly they were right.
Granting that the people of Kansas have a republican form of govern-
ment, it must be admitted that those people desired to try this method
of handling a phase of the wage question. There was an opportunity to
try a plan and get some experience based on its operation. If the
federal Supreme Court had appreciated this, it would seem that the law
might have appeared reasonable. The court has shut the door to that
effort. It has done so on the basis of logic, not on the basis of either
science or the scientific spirit.
There are many experiments to be made. Many of them should be
made. If it is made possible to experiment, the contending interests
will have ground on which to settle their differences by constitutional
rivalry. If this opportunity is not afforded by the courts through the
agency of constitutional interpretation, it must come about through the
less desirable method of constitutional amendment, a method less
desirable for more reasons than one. Should this latter not be accom-
plished, there may appear a reshaping of the conflicting forces with
results that there is no occasion here for naming. Extremes gather
force only against continued resistance.
A further discussion of the programs for wage adjustment would
lead to the constructive consideration of this theme and that must be
undertaken at another time.
'5 Hamoner v. Dagenhart (i918) 247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529; Bailey v. Drexel
Furniture Co. (x922) 259 U. S. 2o, 42 Sup. Ct. 449.
